taneously examining three important components of succession contexts. First, we focused on key characteristics of CEO successors, but we diverged from previous research in that we did not dichotomize CEO successors into insiders and outsiders. Adopting a power circulation theory of control, which takes intrafirm contention into account (Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio & Kim, 1999) , we propose herein that there are two distinct types of insider successors: those appointed following their predecessors' dismissals and those appointed following their predecessors' ordinary retirements. We labeled these two types of inside successors contenders and followers, respectively. Thus, including outsiders, we examined three types of CEO successors. These three types of successors-contenders, followers, and outsiders-differ importantly with respect their ability to manage change, their firmspecific knowledge, and the risk of adverse selection (selection of an unsuitable successor) they pose. We expected them to have different impacts on firm performance.
Second, we focused on postsuccession executive turnover at the top management team level. According to upper echelons theory, it is not a firm's CEO alone, but its entire management team, that shapes strategic decisions ( its performance impact has not received much investigation in previous research. We propose that senior executive turnover following CEO succession reflects top management team dynamics and that its impact on firm performance will be moderated by successor type.
Lastly, we focused on CEO succession frequency at the organizational level by examining the influence of a departing CEO's tenure. Frequent CEO successions may disrupt organizational continuity and hurt firm performance (Grusky, 1963; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . At the same time, long CEO tenure has been found to be directly linked to top management's commitment to the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993) and decreases in the fit between firm strategy, structure, and environmental demands (Miller, 1991) . Drawing on the organizational change literature, we propose that departing CEO tenure importantly affects subsequent firm performance through its impact on organizational inertia and the disruption surrounding a succession event.
Previous research has suggested that many factors influence firm performance. The impact of some factors, such as firm size, governance structure, and industry environment, may be particularly significant in the CEO succession context owing to their potential influence over managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) . To reduce the influence of confounding factors, we included several control variables in our analysis: successor industry experience; firm size, diversification, presuccession performance, and governance structure; and industry performance and instability. Zajac, 1990) . The assumption in most research is that inside successors are appointed under conditions of good company performance and reflect intent to maintain strategic continuity, and outside successors are appointed under conditions of poor company performance and reflect intent to initiate strategic change (Brady & Helmich, 1984) . We agree that firms do not typically appoint outside successors unless they face the pressure of initiating strategic change, coupled with an unavailability of competent inside successor candidates (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Ocasio, 1999) . However, we propose that the appointment of an inside successor does not necessarily reflect intent to maintain strategic continuity. This proposition is grounded in a power circulation theory of control, and it separates our study from mainstream succession research.
The power circulation theory of control (Jackall, 1988; Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio & Kim, 1999) suggests that incumbent CEOs face a risk of power contests initiated by other senior executives as well as by outsider directors. CEOs are surrounded by senior executives who are typically ambitious individuals with strong needs for power and control. The power of a CEO is thus, from time to time, subject to challenge and contestation from these senior executives (Pfeffer, 1981 (Pfeffer, , 1992 . The likelihood of CEO turnover is significantly increased when questions arise about an incumbent's capabilities and viable inside candidates exist (Ocasio, 1994 (Parrino, 1997) . Although this phenomenon has been proposed to reflect managerial entrenchment (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993) , we believe that it more likely reflects the outcome of power struggles within top management. According to power circulation theory (Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio & Kim, 1999) ; an inside succession following a CEO's dismissal reflects a successful internal power contest against the CEO, and the successor is a contending executive who has won the support and approval of the board of directors. In this situation, the inside successor, whom we refer to as a contender, is more likely to be charged with a mandate to initiate strategic change, as is the case in an outside succession, rather than a mandate to maintain strategic continuity.
In contrast, if an inside successor is appointed following the predecessor's ordinary retirement rather than dismissal, the successor's mandate is more likely to be to maintain strategic continuity, as proposed in previous research (Brady & Thus, as noted above, including outsider successors, there are three types of CEO successors: followers, contenders, and outsiders. These three types of CEO successors will have different impacts on postsuccession firm operational performance. We view three sets of factors as the source of performance effects: firm-specific knowledge, change initiatives, and the risk of adverse selection. In our conceptualization, change initiatives have two parts-a board mandate for alterations of firm's strategic profile, and the new leader's propensity for and ability to make such alterations. The risk of adverse selection arises because information asymmetry between the board and successor candidates makes it difficult for the board to accurately assess if the abilities of a potential successor match the needs of the firm. The board may select someone who is poorly suited to the job (Zajac, 1990) .
Follower successors. Follower successors are inside executives who are promoted to CEO positions following the ordinary retirements of their predecessors. As insiders, they possess firm-specific knowledge (Brady & Helmich, 1984) . Further, because of their frequent exposure to their firms' boards of directors and other senior executives, coupled with their history of performance inside the firms, the risk of adverse selection is relatively low (Zajac, 1990) . However, follower successors have significant limitations in their ability to initiate strategic change because they are often selected and groomed by the outgoing CEOs (Cannella & Shen, 2001 ). Incumbent CEOs often believe that their successors should be similar to them (Hambrick et al., 1993), and many incumbents do select such successors when they retire (Levinson, 1974; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) . Because of their close connections and similarities to their predecessors, follower successors are heavily influenced and socialized by their outgoing CEOs and may share with them the same or similar strategic perspectives (Fondas & Wiersema, 1997). They are also significantly constrained by their within-firm social networks (Shleifer & Summers, 1988) . Further, CEO successors promoted after their predecessors' retirements typically have mandates to maintain strategic continuity rather than to initiate change (Friedman & Olk, 1995) . Therefore, although follower successors' firmspecific knowledge and the relatively low risk of adverse selection they pose can help reduce the disruption of CEO succession, their close connection to their predecessors and social networks within the firm, coupled with a likely mandate for continuity rather than change, will impede their initiating significant strategic change and make it difficult for them to significantly influence firm operational performance. Given this, no hypothesis is proposed regarding the performance impact of follower successors.
Contender successors. Contender successors are inside executives who are promoted to CEO positions after the dismissals of their predecessors. Like follower successors, contender successors' work experiences give them firm-specific knowledge (Brady & Helmich, 1984) and their exposure to directors and other senior executives reduces the risk of adverse selection (Zajac, 1990) . What distinguishes contender successors from follower successors is their having mandates for change from their boards of directors and the high likelihood that they will be able to initiate and implement important changes.
Unlike follower successors, who are usually selected and groomed by the outgoing CEOs, contender successors are promoted after successfully challenging their predecessors. Because power contestation and CEO dismissal often occur in periods of poor firm performance (Ocasio, 1994; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991) , contender successors will be charged to initiate strategic change and improve firm performance. CEO dismissal is a very disruptive event, and boards of directors are very cautious in making dismissal decisions (Alderfer, 1986; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) . In order to gain support from directors, contenders for succession must convince them that the incumbent CEOs' competencies are not up to the demands of the job and that they (the contenders) have different strategic perspectives and can perform better (Ocasio, 1994) . Further, contenders may not only have board support, but also support among senior executives for their power contests against the incumbent CEOs ( Vancil, 1987 ). An established power base and support within top management will greatly facilitate the process of taking charge (Gabarro, 1987 Wiersema, 1995) . Also, the popular business press has advocated outsider succession when corporate transformation is required (e.g., BusinessWeek, 1997). However, past research has reported mixed investor reactions to outsider succession, and little is known about its long-term implications (Kesner & Sebora, 1994: 355) . Although the objective of outsider succession is improved firm performance, three factors work against this outcome. First, outsider successors lack firm-specific knowledge. Facing mandates to turn performance around, outsider successors are often pressured to take quick action (Friedman & Saul, 1991) . However, without a deep understanding of their new firms' internal operations and external environments, it is difficult for outsider successors to quickly formulate and implement appropriate strategic changes (Gabarro, 1987; Kotter, 1982) . Second, it is more difficult for directors to fully and accurately evaluate the capabilities of outside candidates (compared with inside candidates) because directors usually do not have a deep familiarity with them. This evaluation difficulty leads to a higher risk of adverse selection in that a newly appointed outsider successor may not fit a firm's strategic demands (Zajac, 1990) . Finally, outsider successors often face the challenge of finding competent and supportive senior executives within their new firms (Friedman & Saul, 1991) . Senior executives have often been selected by outsiders' predecessors and have close connections with them. These executives are often hostile toward outside successors (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Gouldner, 1954) . Constrained by their experiences and by hostility, these executives may have strong commitments to their firms' past strategies and will resist any significant changes initiated by the outsider successors (Helmich & Brown, 1972; Wiersema, 1995) . Although the outsider successors have the support of their boards, the lack of competent and supportive executive teams when they take office puts them at a significant disadvantage. Thus, despite their being appointed to turn around performance, we expected outsider successors to often have negative impacts on operational performance. Hypothesis 2. Outsider successors will be negatively associated with postsuccession operational performance.
Postsuccession Senior Executive Turnover
According to upper echelons theory, a firm's strategies and performance are shaped by its entire top management team rather than by the CEO alone (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) . We expected that personnel changes in a top management team following CEO succession would have a significant impact on firm operational performance. Postsuccession senior executive turnover has been studied primarily as a consequence of CEO succession. Following a "strategic replacement" argument (Gouldner, 1954) Like successor selection, senior executive turnover in different succession contexts likely has different causes, and thus different impacts on firm operational performance. For example, much of the senior executive turnover after a follower succession may simply consist of ordinary retirements rather than dismissals initiated by the new CEO. In other situations, some executives may leave because of their dissatisfaction with their firms' succession decisions or their desire to pursue better career opportunities. Further, the succession context may even significantly moderate the impact of senior executive turnover attributable to dismissal on firm operational performance. Because successor type reflects important characteristics of the succession context, as pointed out earlier, we discuss below how successor type may influence the nature of executive turnover and moderate the association between postsuccession senior executive turnover and firm operational performance.
Senior executive turnover after a follower succession. In a follower succession, the retired CEO exercises a strong influence over the succession process (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) . As discussed earlier, follower successors are usually committed to the retired CEOs' strategies and are unlikely to initiate significant organizational changes. In this context, most senior executive departures are likely to be ordinary retirements among top management team members and to reflect a well-planned succession process in which a new top management team smoothly succeeds the old one (Vancil, 1987) . This kind of senior executive turnover emphasizes continuity of leadership and strategies, and it generally will not have a significant impact on firm performance (Friedman & Singh, 1989) . Even if there are cases in which senior executives depart for reasons other than ordinary retirement, the departures are unlikely to affect firm performance. For example, when these executives quit because they are passed over in the CEO succession tournament, their departures are probably expected and prepared for (Vancil, 1987) . Further, dismissals of executives by follower successors often reflect the successors' efforts to consolidate their leadership rather than efforts to initiate strategic change (Friedman & Saul, 1991) . No matter which scenario unfolds, senior executive turnover in a follower succession context is unlikely to significantly influence firm operational performance.
Senior executive turnover following a contender succession. In a contender succession, senior executive turnover is likely to be greatly influenced by the new CEO's effort to initiate strategic change. As pointed out earlier, contender successors have garnered support from directors in their power contests with their predecessors, and they are expected to perform better than their dismissed predecessors. Under the pressure of improving firm performance, contender successors will be very prudent in assessing the capabilities of their senior executive teams and restructuring them to suit their new strategies. Those executives whose capabilities and loyalties are suited to the predecessors' strategies will be removed in favor of those more suited to the new leaders' strategies. As insiders, contender successors are familiar with both the existing cadre of senior executives and the firms' competitive environments (Brady & Helmich, 1984) . Their valuable firm-specific knowledge can help them reduce the risk of making poor replacement decisions and help them identify and promote executives who are competent to assist them to accomplish the needed strategic change. Thus, senior executive turnover following a contender succession will have a positive impact on operational performance.
Hypothesis 3. Senior executive turnover following a contender succession will be positively associated with postsuccession operational performance.
Senior executive turnover following an outsider succession. Like contenders, outsider successors are also expected to initiate strategic change and turn around firm performance. However, the organizational context of an outsider succession is significantly different from that of a contender succession. An important reason for outsider succession is the judgment by directors that no competent successor candidate is available within their firm (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) . Indeed, an outsider succession often signals a loss of control for a firm's entire top management team, rather than for the CEO alone (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993) . In this situation, tension within the top management team is likely to be high, because senior executives from the previous regime may feel inferior, fearful, or even hostile toward the outsider successor, who may in turn question the competencies of these senior executives (Gouldner, 1954) . Senior executive turnover following an outsider succession, therefore, is likely to be initiated either by the successor, to restructure the top management team (Helmich & Brown, 1972; Wiersema, 1995) , or by the senior executives themselves, out of disappointment with the succession decision and/or the fear of dismissal by the new leader (Friedman & Saul, 1991) . In addition, because the context involves poor firm performance and tension with the outsider successor, some executives who are well suited to helping the outsider successor initiate change may elect to jump ship for better career opportunities elsewhere (Cannella, Fraser, & Lee, 1995) .
Unlike in a contender succession, in an outsider succession senior executive turnover will be detrimental to firm performance for two reasons. First, it further increases the disruption of the outsider succession. Although disruption in an outsider succession is inevitable and necessary to eliminate the influence of past strategies, a certain degree of stability in executive leadership is beneficial to firm operations because outsider successors need time to accumulate firmspecific knowledge (Gabarro, 1987; Kotter, 1982; Virany et al., 1992) . A high rate of senior executive turnover after an outsider succession, especially turnover owing to the executives seeking better career opportunities, will deprive the outsider successor of some managerial talent and a much-needed transition period. Second, unlike contender successors, outsider successors are not familiar with their new firms' internal and external environments, nor do they know their senior executives well. In this situation, executive replacement decisions they make very early in their tenures may not always meet the demands of their competitive environments, and some valuable executive talent may be lost (Gabarro, 1987) . Indeed, such personnel changes may arise more from pressure to initiate change and power consolidation than from a careful assessment of strategic contingencies and executive competencies (Gouldner, 1954) . Such motivation further undermines the quality of the outsider successor's executive replacement decisions. Given these reasons, senior executive turnover following an outsider succession is expected to have a negative impact on firm operational performance. Hypothesis 4. Senior executive turnover following an outsider succession will be negatively associated with postsuccession operational performance.
Departing CEO Tenure
The length of a departing CEO's tenure is another important component of the succession context and reflects the frequency of CEO succession at a firm. Departing CEO tenure influences postsuccession operational performance through organizational inertia and the disruption surrounding CEO succession. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed that CEOs increase commitment to their strategic paradigms over their tenure in office. There is empirical evidence that top executive tenure is directly linked to top management commitment to the status quo (Hambrick et al., 1993 ) and strategic persistence (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Grimm & Smith, 1991) . Because strategies determine the direction of capital investment, the means of resource allocation within a firm, and its exchange relations with other firms (Porter, 1980) , strategic persistence implies a strong continuity in the patterns of these activities, all of which are sources of organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) . Strong inertia arising from a long-tenured CEO can create serious problems for the successor because the strategies and structures developed during the departing CEO's tenure are probably no longer appropriate. For example, Miller (1991) reported a decreased fit between firm strategies, structures, and environmental demands among firms with long-tenured CEOs. For successors who adhere to their predecessors' strategies, negative consequences of the decreased fit are likely to arise. For successors who want to initiate strategic changes, the strong organizational inertia developed during their predecessors' time in office will increase the difficulty of, or may even prevent, accomplishing their goals. Thus, the exit of a long-tenured CEO is likely to have a negative impact on postsuccession operational performance.
However, a very short departing CEO tenure may also be detrimental to postsuccession firm operations. When firms replace their CEOs frequently, the new leaders are often unable to establish reliable and accountable organizational routines because of the disruption associated with each succession event (Vancil, 1987) . This lack of reliability and accountability will have a negative impact on both inside and outside stakeholders (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) . Empirical studies have consistently reported that frequent CEO succession negatively affects firm performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . Further, short CEO tenure often implies that departing CEOs failed to consolidate their leadership, either because they lacked the needed competencies or because the situations they were facing were extremely difficult. The failure of these CEOs drains away valuable resources and worsens the situation faced by their successors (Grusky, 1963) . Thus, like the exit of a long-tenured CEO, the exit of a short-tenured CEO will also have a negative impact on postsuccession firm performance. Given this pattern, we propose an inverted U-shaped relationship between departing CEO tenure and postsuccession firm operational performance. Hypothesis 5. There will be an inverted U-shaped relationship between departing CEO tenure and postsuccession operational performance.
METHODS

Sample and Data Collection
The population for this study was large, publicly traded U.S. corporations. We initially selected a random sample of 300 public corporations reporting at least $200 million in sales for 1988. We then gathered data on CEO succession and senior exec- 
Measures
Dependent variable: Postsuccession operational performance. As pointed out earlier, our study focused on the impact of CEO succession on firm operational performance. Return on assets (ROA) was selected as the dependent variable because it is a well-understood and widely used accounting measure of operational performance in CEO succession research (Zajac, 1990 CEOs who left office before the age of 64 are treated as dismissed, and others, as retired. An examination of our sample suggested that solely relying on CEO age to make the decision might be too crude for our study. Many CEOs in our sample relinquished the CEO title at the age of 62 or 63 but kept the title of chairman of the board until the age of 64 or 65. These CEOs can hardly be treated as dismissed because it is unreasonable to keep a dismissed CEO as the chairman of the board, or even as a director (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) . Indeed, the observation described above may actually reflect an ordinary relay CEO succession process (Vancil, 1987) .
Given that firms are unlikely to keep dismissed CEOs on their boards, we used both CEO age and continued board membership to separate contenders from followers. Further, we checked annual reports, proxy statements, and the Wall Street Journal and News Wires to exclude from our analysis CEO turnovers due to sudden death (12 cases), health issues (2 cases), and taking a similar position at another firm (9 cases). Contender successor was coded 1 when an executive who was currently an officer of a firm was promoted to the CEO position and the departing CEO terminated his/her service as both the CEO and a director of the firm before the age of 64, and it was coded 0 otherwise. Outsider successor was coded 1 when an executive who was not an employee of the focal firm was promoted to the CEO position, and coded 0 otherwise. Follower successors, the omitted category in our analysis, included all noncontender inside successors.
We also examined news reports to bolster our identification of CEO dismissals described above.
Contender and outsider successors identified through news analysis composed a subset of those identified in our above approach. We analyzed this subset of contenders and outsiders and obtained essentially the same result as those reported in the next section, which are based on coding contenders and outsiders as described above. The alternative results are available from the first author on request.
Senior executive turnover was measured as the proportion of officer turnover during the first two years after CEO succession. We selected a two-year period to fully capture the succession effect on executive turnover (Wagner et al., 1984) and the period normally required for a new CEO to fully take charge in a new job (Gabarro, 1987; Vancil, 1987) . We measured turnover among all executives who were listed as officers in a firm's annual report to shareholders one year prior to the year of succession. Departing CEO tenure was measured as the number of years an individual had served as the CEO of the firm from which he or she was departing. To test for the inverted U-shaped relationship hypothesized, we also included departing CEO tenure squared in the analysis.
Control variables. A number of factors, such as firm size, governance structure, and industry environment, may influence firm performance in the CEO succession context through their impacts on managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) . To control for the influence of these and other important factors, we included nine control variables in our analysis. Like firm-specific knowledge, industry experiences of CEO successors may play an important role in firm performance (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998). To ensure that it is firmspecific knowledge rather than industry experience that makes performance differences among CEO successors, we included a dummy variable, industry outsider, as a control in our analysis. Industry outsider was coded 1 when a successor had less than two years' industry experience (at the twodigit SIC level) and 0 otherwise. Presuccession firm ROA was included to control the potential threat of "regression to the mean" (Brown, 1982) 
Statistical Analysis
We tested our hypotheses using hierarchical multiple regression. In a hierarchical multiple regression analysis, explanatory variables are entered into the regression equation in a prespecified order as a means of determining their individual and joint contributions to explaining the outcome variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989) . In our analysis, we first entered into the regression equation the nine control variables. Following the time order of their occurrence, we entered the explanatory variables in the following order: departing CEO tenure first, contender and outsider successors next, senior executive turnover and its interactions with contender and outsider successors last. Although our study emphasizes operational performance, we also ran an analysis with market performance as a dependent variable, measured as a firm's average market-to-book value ratio in the first three years following the succession. The results suggest that succession does not importantly influence a firm's long-term market performance. Because of our emphasis on operational performance, we report this analysis in the Appendix. Table 2 An important observation that can be made from our analyses is that the main effect of postsuccession senior executive turnover on firm ROA remains negative and significant in model 6, when its interaction with contender successor is included (b = -7.77, p < .05), but it becomes insignificant in model 7, when turnover's interaction with outsider successor is controlled (b = -1.06, n.s.). Thus, the negative main effect of senior executive turnover on firm ROA may come primarily from senior executive turnover following outsider succession.
Hypothesis 5 predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between departing CEO tenure and postsuccession firm performance. Models 2 and 3 show results of tests of this hypothesis. In model 2, the addition of departing CEO tenure does not significantly increase the explanatory power (AR2 = .00, n.s.), nor is the coefficient significant (b = 0.05, n.s.). However, with the addition of departing CEO tenure squared, model 3 has significantly higher explanatory power than model 1 (AR2 = .01, p < .01). Further, the coefficient for departing CEO tenure squared is negative and significant (b = -0.01, First, the evidence supports our proposition that to rely solely on firm origin to divide CEO successors into insiders and outsiders is to neglect important differences among insider successors. Following a power circulation theory (Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio & Kim, 1999), we distinguished two types of insider successors, contenders and followers, on the basis of how their predecessors left the positions to which they succeeded. We proposed that contenders and followers differ in their strategic mandates and their ability to initiate strategic change. Although the results did not support our hypothesis regarding a positive main effect of a successor contender (an insider who struggled with the departing CEO), they do support our argument that senior executive turnover following a contender succession has a positive impact on firm performance. Further, the correlations reported in Table 1 show that both contender and outsider successors are positively correlated with postsuccession senior executive turnover, which has been used as an indicator of strategic change in earlier studies (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Helmich & Brown, 1972) . These findings support our proposition that contender successors importantly differ from follower successors, though both are insiders. One of our explanations for our not finding a main effect of contender successors on firm ROA is that contenders, though they differ from followers, are still constrained by their social networks within their firms (Shleifer & Summers, 1988) . Unless they can restructure their top management teams, they will not be able to improve firm performance. An alternative explanation follows the power perspective: some contender successions after CEO dismissal may reflect the outcome of power struggles within top management rather than an intention to initiate strategic change (Jackall, 1988; Vancil, 1987) . Because of the prestige and material benefits associated with the CEO title, some ambitious senior executives may challenge an incumbent CEO simply to advance their own careers (Lazear, 1989) . Because the distinction between contender and follower successors is new and important, more research is needed regarding the antecedents and consequences of these two types of insider successors. Second, our study clearly demonstrates that focusing on a CEO successor alone without considering other personnel changes within top management cannot fully and accurately capture the performance consequences of CEO succession. Postsuccession senior executive turnover has been primarily studied as an outcome of CEO succession (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Helmich & Brown, 1972) . Results of this study suggest that postsuccession senior executive turnover has important implications for firm performance and, more important, that the direction of its impact depends on successor type. We found that senior executive turnover has a positive impact on firm ROA in contender succession, but a negative impact in outsider succession. These findings not only highlight the importance of taking a top-management-teambased approach when studying the performance impact of CEO succession, but also suggest that there are different patterns of top management team dynamics in contender, outsider, and follower successions.
Although we conceptually discussed different types of executive turnover (ordinary retirement, dismissal, and seeking outside opportunities) in our theory development, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine them empirically. A potential direction for future research is to study the pattern of different types of executive turnover in contender, outsider, and follower CEO successions and 728 August their organizational implications. Further, although we controlled for industry ROA and instability in our analysis, it would be interesting to consider whether these and other industry characteristics, such as growth rate (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998), would moderate the performance consequences of postsuccession senior executive turnover. By focusing on the dynamics of entire top management teams rather than on CEO successors alone, researchers will be able to gain a better understanding of the performance consequences of CEO succession.
An extension of the above proposition would be to examine the patterns and performance consequences of changes in the boards of directors in contender, follower, and outsider successions. CEO succession certainly influences the dynamics within top management teams, and perhaps also the composition and structure of boards In this study, the proportion of independent outside directors displayed a consistent, positive impact on postsuccession firm ROA. Thus, it will be interesting and important to study whether the three types of CEO successions proposed in this study have different impacts on board composition and structure and their subsequent organizational implications. In addition, we need to investigate how board composition and structure influence the occurrence of the three types of successions, since boards play an important role in succession decisions Weisbach, 1988) . Third, our study helps to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the performance impact of outsider succession. Successor origin has been a primary focus in previous studies of the performance consequences of CEO succession, and there is pressure from the business press for firms to adopt outsider succession (e.g., BusinessWeek, 1997). Earlier empirical evidence has been inconclusive regarding how outside successors influence firm performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . Our results show that the impact of outsider successors on firm ROA is significantly influenced by postsuccession senior executive turnover in that its main effect changes from negative to positive when its negative interaction with senior executive turnover is controlled. This change suggests that the negative impact of outsider succession on firm operational performance stems largely from a high level of postsuccession senior executive turnover. In other words, outsider successors may be beneficial to firm operations, but a subsequent loss of senior executives may outweigh any gains that come from the outsider successors themselves.
Finally, our study reveals that, in addition to successor type and postsuccession senior executive turnover, the tenure of departing CEOs importantly influences firm operational performance. We proposed that lengthy CEO tenures would be associated with strong organizational inertia, leading to difficulty when the successors wish to initiate strategic change. However, if a departing CEO's tenure is too short, the firm may not have recovered sufficiently from the disruption of the previous succession. This proposition was supported by the inverted U-shaped relationship between departing CEO tenure and postsuccession firm ROA. Although the impact of CEO tenure on firm strategy and performance has been examined in previous research (Hambrick et al., 1993; Miller, 1991 ; Thomas, Litschert, & Ramaswamy, 1991), our study demonstrates that this impact does not disappear with the end of the CEO's tenure. Instead, it extends at least to the early years of the successor's tenure. CEO tenure has also been found to significantly influence the power dynamics within top management (Boeker, 1992; Ocasio, 1994) . As an extension, it would be interesting to examine whether departing CEO tenure influences successor type and postsuccession senior executive turnover.
Limitations
The findings and implications of this study must be considered in light of its limitations. A primary limitation is that our study focused only on firms' operational performance and used three-year average ROA as an indicator. This measure, widely used in succession research, only captures the operational performance consequences of CEO succession in the first three years after its occurrence and tells us nothing about later performance. It is possible that the performance consequences of CEO succession, especially outsider succession, may differ in the later years of these CEOs' tenures. In addition, our findings should not be generalized to firms' performance in financial markets, because ROA and market valuation reflect different aspects of firm performance (Daily et al., 2000; Dalton et al., 1998).
A second limitation is that we used publicly observable managerial characteristics as proxies for unobservable or hard-to-observe variables. Because it is difficult to know the true causes of CEO turn- 
Managerial Implications
Findings from this study have two important managerial implications. The first concerns top management team restructuring following contender and outsider successions. Facing tremendous pressure to initiate strategic change, contenders and outsiders may make restructuring top management teams their top priority (Helmich & Brown, 1972; Wiersema, 1995) . Our evidence demonstrates that the operational performance impact of this practice differs significantly for contender and outsider successions. Whereas postsuccession senior executive turnover was found to improve firm ROA among companies experiencing contender successions, its impact among those gaining outsider successors was negative, at least as measured for the first three years of the outsider successors' tenure with firm ROA as the outcome measure. As we pointed out earlier, this result is mainly a consequence of the outsider successors' lack of firm-specific knowledge and the tremendous disruption already present in outsider succession. Thus, we advise newly appointed outsider CEOs to be prudent when making executive replacement decisions and to strive for some executive leadership stability in their firms. At the same time, boards may also need to consider giving outside successors more time to smooth the transition.
Second, in accordance with many other studies (e.g., Vancil, 1987 
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